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Abstract
We study the public policy implications of a model in which agents do
not fully internalize all the conscequences of their actions. Such a model unies
seemingly disconected models with behavioral agents. We evaluate the scope of
paternalistic and libertarian-parternalistic policies in the light of our model, and
propose an alternative type of approach, called soft-libertarian, which guides
the decision makers in the internalization of all the conscequences of their ac-
tions. Psychotherapy is one example of a soft-libertarian policy. Moreover, we
show that in our behavioral framework, policies that increase the set of oppor-
tunities or provide more information to the agent may not longer be individual
welfare improving.
JEL Classication numbers: D03, D60, I30.
Keywords: Behavioral Decisions, Revealed Preferences, Normative Prefer-
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1 Introduction
"Most powerful is he who has himself in his own power" (Seneca, 5
BC - 65 AD)
There is already accumulated evidence showing that the standard model of hu-
man decision-making provides an inadequate positive description of human behavior.
People make systematic mistakes in identiable circumstances. People save less than
what they would like; fail to take advantage of low interest loans available through
life insurance policies; unsuccessfully attempt to quit smoking; maintain substantial
balances on high-interest credit cards; etc.
To account for this evidence, behavioral economists have proposed alternative
models that incorporate insights from psychology. Typically, these models predict
outcomes that are suboptimal from the decision makers (DM) point of view. Such
concerns inevitably challenge the way in which welfare economics and policy analysis
have been conducted since Samuelsons (1938) doctrine of revealed preferences. Ac-
cording to the revealed preferences approach, planners infer what people want from
what they choose. When evaluating policies, planners use the ranking inferred from
choices as a welfare standard to evaluate the e¤ect of policies on welfare. However,
in a world in which individuals choices do not reveal what is best for the person,
how should welfare and policy analysis be performed? Can choices alone inform us
whether the person is behaving sub-optimally or optimally? Under what conditions
can choices remain as foundations for compelling welfare standards? What are the
policy implications in a world in which people make systematic mistakes?
In a recent paper, Dalton and Ghosal (2010a) (Henceforth DG (2010a)) proposed
a framework to answer the rst three questions above. Their approach highlights a
typical mistake that leads decision-makers (DMs) to systematically end up in sub-
optimal outcomes. In their model, DMs do not fully anticipate the consequences
of their actions. While in some cases DMs may correctly forecast the near-term
consequences of their actions (e.g. getting a nicotine rush from smoking a cigarette),
they may fail to predict their more delayed consequences (e.g. developing nicotine
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dependency or lung cancer from smoking). Assuming partial prediction of changes in
psychological states or reference points is su¢ cient to unify seemingly disconnected
models in behavioral economics.
DG (2010a) show that all the behavioral economics models reduced in their frame-
work are testable by a simple condition on observable choice data. This condition
(introduced by Cherno¤, 1954 and Sen, 1971) requires that if an alternative is chosen
in a set, it must be chosen in all subsets of it to which the alternative belongs. If
observed behavior is consistent with this condition, we know that the DM is not fully
internalizing all the consequences of her actions1. Moreover, they show that typically,
when this condition is satised, the outcome is sub-optimal.
This paper builds on these results and addresses the implications of behavioral
decisions for policy analysis. We ask how public policy should be conducted in the
presence of behavioral DMs. In standard welfare analysis, the planner assumes that
the DM makes the right choices according to her own normative preferences, so the
only information needed to evaluate public policies is derived from observed choices.
We now know that in a world with behavioral DMs, choices alone can identify whether
the DM is internalizing all the consequences of her actions. What we cannot know by
observing choices alone, however, is the normative preferences of the behavioral DM.
More information is needed to provide the planner with a road map on how to perform
policy analysis. The aim of this paper, thus, is to asses the existing policy approaches
in a world in which the planner has incomplete information about the normative
preferences of the DM. We show that the desirability of paternalistic interventions
are limited by the information a planner has. We argue in favour of an alternative
policy approach, labelled "soft-libertarian", which does not require knowledge of the
1Note that, contrary to the recent literature of behavioural welfare economics (Bernheim and
Rangel (2009) and Salant and Rubinstein (2008)), Dalton and Ghosals (2010a) focus is on iden-
tifying the way people make decisions, instead of dealing with the inconsistencies on choice corre-
spondence (e.g preferences reversal). The main point is that even when the ranking derived from
choices is acyclic (which is su¢ cient for welfare analysis in Bernheim and Rangel (2009), it may
still not represent what is best for the individual, and therefore, that acyclic ranking may not be an
appropriate measure for welfare analysis.
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normative preferences of the DM. We conclude proposing a concrete road map for
the planner which incorporates the four policy approaches (libertarian, paternalistic,
soft-paternalistic and soft-libertarian).
Briey, the road map we propose is as follows. If observed choices are consistent
with Arrows (1959) axiom of choice, behavior is consistent with a DM who is fully in-
ternalizing her feedback e¤ect. In such cases, standard revealed preferences approach
should be applied for welfare analysis and a planner should choose whatever a person
would choose for herself. If, however, observed choices violate Arrows (1959) axiom
and are consistent with Cherno¤s (1954) axiom then the planner knows that the DM
is typically making a suboptimal decision: there is scope for intervention.
How should the planner intervene in those cases? We rst consider the two most
prominent existing policy approaches: hard-paternalism and libertarian-paternalism
(Thaler and Sustein, 2003) and evaluate them in light of our framework. A pa-
ternalistic planner will either choose the optimal action for the DM or induce the
DM to choose that optimal action via taxes. A libertarian-paternalistic planner will
choose the reference point (or the distribution of reference points) such that the DM
is induced to choose the optimal action.
In order to be implemented, both approaches require the planner to have informa-
tion about the DMs normative preferences and the intensity of her mistake. The cost
of acquiring this information varies across di¤erent situations. There are situations,
for example, in which the DM will choose suboptimally with high probability (e.g.
children, adolescents or adults incapable of engaging in contracts). In these extreme
cases the cost is almost zero and paternalistic interventions make perfect sense. Also,
there are situations where DMs (even highly educated adults) choose systematically
suboptimal outcomes and where their normative preferences are clear for the plan-
ner. An example of this situation that has received considerable research attention
is default options for 401(k) retirement plans. If it is objectively benecial to invest
in a 401k plan (i.e. normative preferences are clear), but people tend to stick with
the status quo (i.e. the mistake is also clear), then it may make sense to change the
usual default from not contributing (with the possibility of signing up) to contribut-
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ing (with the possibility of opting out). In this cases, the libertarian paternalistic
approach proposed by Thaler and Sustein is the most cost-e¤ective intervention.
However, in most of the cases, the probability that the planner knows the individ-
ual normative preferences is very low, so the applicability of hard or soft paternalistic
policies is, at least, contentious. For instance take the case of smoking. Clearly, there
are smokers who dont want to quit smoking and whose behavior is perfectly aligned
with their normative preferences. There are also smokers who wish to quit smoking,
who attempt to do so, but who fail. In such cases, paternalistic policies will inevitably
violate the autonomy of some DMs (those who do not wish to quit smoking).
We propose an alternative policy approach labelled soft-libertarianwhich does
not require the planner to know or impose the normative preferences of the individual.
We argue in favour of interventions that directly target the abilities needed to inter-
nalize the feedback from actions to psychological states. In most cases, such abilities
are not simply learned with a leaet informing about the consequences of actions.
The mechanism behind may be very subtle, and it may require the arrangement of
institutional structures such as behavioral therapies that enhance emotional intelli-
gence for anger control, to reduce anxiety or to control temptations. The role of the
planner should be to create the institutional structure to assist the DMs in achieving
her own normative preferences. For that, the DM should be aware of the (sometimes
unconscious) mechanisms guiding her behavior and determining her wellbeing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey presents a
special case of the model of DG (2010a), paper to which we refer the reader for addi-
tional details. Section 3 evaluates the scope of existing public policies and proposes the
soft-libertarian approach. Section 4 provides philosophical and psychological grounds
for the normative approach proposed. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
Let p be a psychological state (with P the corresponding set) and a the action chosen
by the DM (with A the corresponding set2). The preferences of the DM are repre-
sented by a utility function u : A  P ! <. In addition, there is a feedback e¤ect
from a to p represented by the function  : A ! P . A consistent decision state is a
pair (a; p) such that p = (a).
In a standard decision problem (SDP), the DM fully internalizes the feedback
e¤ect via the map  : A! P and solves:
Maxfa2Agv (a)
where v (a) = u (a;  (a)).
The FOC characterizing an interior solution a to a SDP is
@av(a
) = @au(a; (a)) + @pu(a; (a))@a(a) = 0
In a Behavioral decision problem (BDP) the DM doesnt internalize the feedback
from actions to the psychological state. At a solution to a BDP, we require that (a)
given the utility parameter, the action is optimal for the decision maker and (b) the
utility parameter is generated, via the feedback e¤ect, by the chosen action. Formally,
for given p, let (p) = argmaxa2A u (a; p). A solution to a BDP is a pair (a^; p^) such
that (i) Given p^, a^ 2 (p^) and (ii) p^ =  (a^).
The FOC characterizing an interior solution (a^; p^) to a BDP is
@au(a^; (a^)) = 0 and p^ = (a^) = 0
In a BDP, DMs choose a pair (a; p = (a)) such that u(a; p = (a))  u(a0; p =
(a)): Note that a0 is now paired with p = (a) and not with p0 = (a0). This
mispairingis the decision-making mistake. Behavioral DMs compare actions using
the psychological state associated with their chosen action, p = (a) instead of varying
the psychological state as they consider alternative actions.
2In what follows we will assume that both P and A are compact convex subset of a nite dimen-
sional Euclidian space.
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Following Harsanyi (1954), in order to make welfare assessments in this setting,
we will assume intrapersonal comparability of preferences. Formally, in our setting,
the pair (a; p) dominates the decision state (a0; p0) when u(a; p) > u(a0; p0). A consis-
tent decision state (a; p) is e¢ cient if there is no other consistent decision state that
dominates it.
Clearly, except in exceptional cases, the outcomes of a BDP will be welfare dom-
inated by the SDP outcome. In that sense, in a BDP the decision maker imposes an
(internal) constraint on his decision problem as he does not internalize the feedback
e¤ect from one component of his object of choice into the other. Because of this ad-
ditional constraint, behavioral equilibria are likely to be sub-optimal, which explains
self-defeating behavior.
How strong is the assumption of an internal constraint? Psychological states can
have di¤erent interpretations. They must a¤ect DMs preference ranking over actions
and, in turn, they must be a¤ected by the DMs actions (at least partially). Examples
of endogenous psychological states are aspirations, beliefs, moods, states of mind,
temptations, motivations, self-condence, reference points, the same environment,
life styles, etc.
Our framework is closely related to the literature on a¤ective forecasting and pro-
jection bias (Loewenstein et al, 2003), where people make systematic inaccurate pre-
dictions about how they will feel in situations, even if the situation people experience
objectively matches the situation they imagined. It is shown that people misjudge
self capacities to carry out certain actions (Baumeister and Scher, 1988), mispredict
a¤ective reactions overestimating regret and rejoicing (Sevdalis and Harvey, 2007)
and fail to bear in mind that they will adapt (Fagerlin et al, 2005).3
In sum, we model people who fail to fully internalize how their own psychological
states will change with their own actions. This assumption alone is su¢ cient to unify
3Our model is consistent with the approach from social psychology called "reciprocal determin-
ism" (Bandura 2001). This approach sustain that the way people interpret the results of their own
behaviour informs and alters their environments and personal factors which, in turn, inform and
alter subsequent behaviour through an "environmental feedback e¤ect."
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seemingly disconnected models in behavioral economics. These models include sit-
uations where the preference parameter corresponds to the decision makers current
state (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), beliefs (Geanakoplos et al, 1989; Akerlof and
Dickens, 1982), emotional states (Loewenstein, et al, 2003; Bracha and Brown, 2007),
reference points (Shalev, 2000, Koszegi, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007), aspi-
rations (Ray, 2006; Dalton et al, 2010) or past consumption (Von Weizsacker, 1971;
Hammond, 1976; Pollak, 1978).
From DG (2010a) we know that each of these behavioral economics models are
testable by a single condition on observable choice data. This condition (introduced by
Cherno¤, 1954 and Sen, 1971) requires that if an alternative is chosen in a set, it must
be chosen in all subsets of it to which the alternative belongs. If observed behavior
is consistent with this condition, we know that the DM is not fully internalizing all
the consequences of her actions. Moreover, from DG (2010a) we also know that when
this condition is satised, the outcome is typically sub-optimal.
In the following section we build on these results and study the implications of
behavioral decisions for policy analysis.
3 Behavioral Public Policy
What are the policy implications of behavioral decision making, i.e. assuming that
people dont necessarily follow their own best interests?
The goal of any public policy ought to be to maximize peoples well-being. The
route a social planner chooses to take in order to achieve that goal will depend on
the social planners beliefs, her information on underlying normative preferences and
on the way the individual chooses i.e. whether the DM is solving a BDP or a SDP.
From DG (2010a) we know that we can infer only from choices whether the DM
is solving a BDP or a SDP. If observed choices are consistent with Arrows axiom
of choice, behavior is consistent with a DM who is solving a SDP. In such cases,
standard revealed preferences approach should be applied for welfare analysis and
a planner should choose whatever a person would choose for herself. If, however,
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observed choices violate Arrows (1959) axiom and are consistent with Cherno¤s
(1954) axiom then the planner knows that the DM is solving a BDP and, typically,
making a suboptimal decision. In such cases, there is scope for intervention. Which
type of intervention is more desirable will depend on the information a social planner
has about a DMs preferences. Below we introduce some additional notation to clarify
this argument.
Fix (A;P; ). As before, let v(a) = u(a; (a)). We assume that the social plan-
ners goal is to maximize v(a) choosing an action a 2 A. We consider a world in
which information is incomplete in two ways. First, the social planner may have in-
complete information about the intensity of the mistake of the DM. We assume that
the planner attaches a probability  (respectively 1 ) to the DM solving a SDP (re-
spectively BDP). Second, the social planner may have incomplete information about
the normative preferences of the DM (i.e. preferences and feedback e¤ect). We as-
sume he attaches a probability 0 to correct preferences and feedback e¤ect but with
probability (1   0) he uses a completely wrong set of preferences or feedback e¤ect
resulting in attaching a weight (1   0) to some function v0 : A ! R, v0() 6= v()
where v0(a) = u0(a; 0(a)).
In this scenario, we distinguish between four di¤erent kinds of interventions:
(A) direct paternalism: to impose a choice a on the DM;
(B) indirect paternalism: to impose a tax or a subsidy on the DM;
(C) liberarian-paternalism: to choose the initial p0 (e.g. reference point) for the
DM;
(D) soft-libertarian: to use psychological therapies that allow the DM to internal-
ize the feedback e¤ect.
In what follows, we review these four approaches in a world with behavioral DMs.
We nish the section showing that policies such as increasing opportunities or provid-
ing information that in a standard economic framework are known to be individual
welfare improving, may not longer be in a world with behavioral DMs.
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3.1 Direct paternalism
Dworkin (2002) denes paternalism as "the interference of a state or an individual
with another person, against their will, and justied by a claim that the person inter-
fered with will be better o¤ or protected from harm."
This denition assumes that (a) the planner has complete information about the
DMs normative preferences (i.e. 0 = 1) and (b) the planner knows that the DM
is solving a BDP, so typically, she wouldnt choose optimally in the absence of the
intervention (i.e. 0 <  < 1). In which case, the planner believes that the individual
solves:
Maxfa2Agv(a) + (1  )u(a; p)
where with some probability  she takes the feedback e¤ect from actions to preference
parameters into account, and with some probability (1  ) she does not. The FOC
is:

"
@au(~a; (~a))
+@pu(~a; (~a))@a(~a)
#
+ (1  ) [@au(~a; ~p)] = 0
~p = (~a) (4)
where (~a(); ~p ()) denote the solution of the problem. Note that (~a(1); ~p (1)) =
(a; p), the outcome of the SDP while (~a(0); ~p (0)) = (a^; p^), an outcome of the BDP.
Suppose now a more realistic scenario, in which we allow the planner to have in-
complete information about the DM. The planner attaches a probability 0 to correct
preferences and feedback e¤ect but with probability (1   0) he uses a completely
wrong set of preferences or feedback e¤ect resulting in attaching a weight (1  0) to
some function v0 : A! R, v0() 6= v() where v0(a) = u0(a; 0(a)). Then, the the social
planner maximizes:
Maxfa2Ag0v(a) + (1  0)v0(a)
The FOC is:
0
"
@au(a
0; (a0))
+@pu(a
0; (a0))@a(a0)
#
+ (1  0)
"
@au
0(a0; 0(a0))
+@pu
0(a0; 0(a0))@a0(a0)
#
= 0 (5)
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Let [a0(); p0 ()] denote the solution. Note that [a0(1); a0 (1)] = [a; p] :4
It follows that the extent of direct paternalism is limited by the trade-o¤ between
 and 0. If the DM is solving a SDP with very high probability (high ) and the so-
cial planner has relatively imprecise information about the individual (low 0), then
intervention may cause more harm than good. On the other hand, if it is highly
likely that the DM is solving a BDP ( is low) and the social planner has precise
information about the individual (high 0) then intervention could lead to welfare
improvements. This trade-o¤ explains, for example, why the sale of cigarettes and
alcohol is legal for adult decision-makers (who are supposed to be of high ) but
prohibited to minors. Children do not know what is on their best interest and their
actions often fail to reect valid preferences, probably because they give insu¢ cient
weight to consequences. Therefore, few economists will reject the view that a libertar-
ian approach is appropriate when the DM is a "responsible" adult and a paternalistic
approach is suitable when the DM is a child. However, the spectrum of DMs in real
world is not only determined by these two types of DMs. We know from empirical
work in psychology and behavioral economics that (highly educated) adults make
suboptimal choices. As highlighted by Bernheim and Rangel (2007) "its di¢ cult to
justify, objectively, the sense in which the revealed preferences of an irresponsible
nineteen-year-old are legitimate, whereas those of a fourteen-year-old are not. While
turning eighteen has profound legal signicance, it doesnt discontinuously change the
mechanics of decision-making." Usually, the planner has vague information about 
and 0; which weakens the case for libertarian and paternalistic policies. We will ar-
gue later on for an alternative approach, soft-libertarian, as solution to this problem.
But before we embark on this route, we will discuss the cases for indirect paternalism
and libertarian-paternalism.
4In the extreme case in which the planner had complete information about normative preferences
and also believed that the DM solves a SDP ( = 1 and 0 = 1) we would be back to the standard
welfare economics approach, in which the planner would simply choose a 2 argmaxa2A v(a), i.e.
what the person would choose for herself. So our framework incorporates standard welfare analysis
as a special case.
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3.2 Indirect paternalism
In the transferable utility case, instead of imposing an action directly on the indi-
vidual, the social planner could impose a per unit tax (or a subsidy) which would
induce the individual to make the right choice. If rst-order conditions are valid in
characterizing an optimum for both a SDP or a BDP, then the tax t 2 < would work
as follows. The outcome (a^; p^) of a BDP with a tax t 2 < satises the rst-order
condition:
@au(a^; p^) + t = 0; p^ = (a^): (6)
By setting t =  @pu(a; (a))@a(a), that is, at a level in which the marginal
benet of choosing a suboptimal action equals the marginal internal damage that
DM imposes on herself, the planner would ensure that at a BDP, the DM chooses the
same action as in a SDP. Clearly, such a tax is equivalent to a Pigouvian tax per-unit,
but instead of internalizing externalities producing on others, the tax ensures that
the DM internalizes the externalities produced on herself.
Note, however, that the above solution relies on the social planner not only having
information about the underlying preferences and feedback e¤ect but also on whether
the individual is solving a BDP or a SDP.
Suppose that the social planner has incomplete information about the DMs way
of solving the problem and attaches a probability  to the DM solving a SDP. It
follows from (5) that by imposing a tax t () =   (1  ) [ @pu(a; (a))@a(a)],
the social planner ensures that [~a(); ~p ()] = [a; p]. Note that the absolute value
of t is decreasing in  and will be a function of the degree of uncertainty the social
planner has about whether the DM is solving a SDP or a BDP. However, for any xed
value of t(), the decision-maker never achieves a SDP outcome. If the DM is solving
a SDP, there will be distortion; further, by substitution in (6), the actual outcome of
a BDP will not coincide with that of a SDP.
Suppose now the social planner attaches a probability 0 to the correct pref-
erences and feedback e¤ect and with probability (1   0) the social planner uses
a completely wrong set of preferences or feedback e¤ect resulting in attaching a
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weight (1   0) to some function ~v : A ! R, ~v() 6= v(): Then, the target for
the social planner is [a0(0); p0 (0)]. If the social planner believes that the individ-
ual is solving a BDP with probability 1, the social planner will set a tax t0() =
  (1  ) [ @pu(a0(0); (a0(0))@a(a0(0))] which will distort matters further a con-
clusion reinforced if, in addition, the social planner believes with probability 1   
the individual is solving a BDP.
As in the case of direct paternalism, the extent, and usefulness, of indirect pater-
nalism is limited by the information available to the social planner.
3.3 Libertarian-paternalism
So far we have considered only the case of "hard" paternalism, in which the social
planner chooses an action instead of the individual or sets a tax to induce the in-
dividual to choose a particular action. Intermediate forms of soft-paternalism have
recently emerged as a compromise between fully libertarian and hard-paternalistic
views5. The ultimate goal of soft-paternalistic policies is to guide individuals behav-
ior in directions that will promote individuals welfare while minimizing coercion.
Thaler and Sustein (2003) recommend a type of soft-paternalism labelled liber-
tarian paternalism. They argue that, in the cases in which the choice is reference-
dependent (e.g. status quo bias or default option bias), the social planner should
choose the reference point or default option in order to steer peoples choices in desir-
able directions. In this way, the social planner would achieve her goal of maximizing
peoples welfare without forcing anybody to do anything they wouldnt do.
To what extent are their conclusions a¤ected when reference points are endoge-
nous? Note that if there is a unique outcome of a BDP, then the initial policy-
determined reference point will not have an impact on the steady state preferences
to which the DM with adaptive preferences converges to. On the other hand, if the
BDP has multiple behavioral outcomes, then the initial policy-determined reference
5See Loewenstein and Haisley (2008) for a review of methodological issues that arise in designing,
implementing and evaluating the e¢ cacy of "soft" paternalism. See also Koorman and Prast (2010)
for discussion of libertarian paternalistic policies related to health and saving behaviour.
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point might have an impact by selecting which steady-state preferences the decision-
maker converges to. Consider the following example. Suppose p is the label attached
to objects of choice (such as "default option"). Let A = fa; a0g and P = fp = "a is
the default option", p0 = "a0is the default option"g. Consistency requires that if the
chosen action is a the default option is p while if the chosen action is a0 the default
option is p0. In a BDP, the individual will take the label as given (without taking
into account that it is a characteristic pertaining to the object) and may choose a
over a0 at p and a0 over a at p0. In a SDP, the individual will consider the label as a
characteristic of the available object of choice and will choose the optimal pair which
without loss of generality we may set as (a; p). Solving a SDP in this setting requires
DM to be aware that frames (such as labels or defaults) can mislead her decision, so
she should internalize that when making her optimal choice. We acknowledge that
this is a strong assumption to make. In fact, in some cases (like the default options
for 401(k) retirement plans), the planner knows the normative preferences of the DMs
(it is objectively benecial to invest in a 401k plan), and knows that most of the DMs
make the same mistake (they tend to stick with the status quo). So in those cases, it
makes sense to change the usual default from not contributing (with the possibility
of signing up) to contributing (with the possibility of opting out).
However, there are many other cases in which the planner has incomplete informa-
tion about the normative preferences, the feedback e¤ect and the mistake the person
makes. In such situations, we argue that the libertarian-paternalistic approach can
be misleading.
To justify our claim, consider the following example where an internal state of
the individual (such as self-condence) adjusts to her actions. The payo¤-relevant
variables are:
(i) a set of actions A = fa; ag, a < a, where a represents maintaining the existing
status quo and a represents changing the existing status quo by undertaking higher
e¤ort (e.g. going to College) and
(ii) a set of psychological states P where p 2 P represents the internal state of
the DM (e.g. self-condence level).
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The preferences of the DM are represented by a utility function u(a; p) = b(a)  
c(a; p); where b(a) is the benet the individual obtains from her new social status and
c(a; p) is the perceived cost of e¤ort, which is decreasing in p but increasing in a. For
simplicity, assume that u (a; p), the DMs utility from preserving the status quo, is
normalized to zero for all values of p and for each p; u (a; p) is the perceived net gain
(or loss) to the DM in deviating from the status quo. Then, under the assumptions
made so far, u (a; p0) > u (a; p), for p0 > p. For example, if a is interpreted as going to
College, and a as staying at home, this inequality implies that the higher the persons
self-condence, the more she enjoys College. In addition, assume that u (a; p) is
continuous in p.
For each p; the DM solves the maximization problem maxa2A u (a; p). This gener-
ates an optimal action correspondence (p) = argmaxa2A u (a; p). Under our assump-
tions, there is a unique solution p^ to the equation u (a; p) = 0. The threshold p^ is the
level of self-condence that makes the DM indi¤erent between going to College and
staying in the status-quo. Given p, the optimal action correspondence is determined
as follows:
(i) whenever p < p^, a = (p);
(ii) whenever p > p^, a = (p);
(iii) whenever p = p^, fa; ag = (p).
Therefore, a DMwith su¢ ciently low p will prefer to remain in status-quo, whereas
an individual with su¢ ciently high p will see it as convenient to exert e¤ort to change
her status-quo.
The feedback e¤ect from actions to p is captured by an increasing function  :
fa; ag ! P; that assigns a p to each action. For example, the fact that the DM goes
to College generates a higher p. Let p =  (a) and p =  (a), p < p, be the lowest
and highest values of the psychological variable consistent with the actions available.
That is, going to College is consistent with endorsing high self-condence, and staying
at home is consistent with endorsing low self-condence.
In a SDP, the DM internalizes the e¤ect of her actions on her self-condence and
then chooses a 2 argmaxa2Au(a; (a)). In other words, the standard DM is able to
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predict how it will feel to be a student. She anticipates that by going to College she
will gain condence, and given that condence, she will make her decision.
In a BDP, the DM takes as given the e¤ect of her actions on her condence and
then chooses a 2 argmaxa2Au(a; p) given p 2 P . The initial level of condence is
crucial to predict the outcome of a behavioral DM as the DM will not foresee that
going to College will give her a higher condence, maybe needed to make the decision
to go to College in the rst place.
Suppose p  p^  p: Then, there is a unique SDP outcome (a; p), but two BDP
outcomes f(a; p); (a; p)g6. Call (a; p) a type I equilibrium and (a; p) a type II equi-
librium. In a type I equilibrium, there is no change in the status quo while in a type
II equilibrium there is a change in the status quo: observe that a type II equilibrium
welfare dominates a type I equilibrium.
If the social planner knows the preferences and the feedback e¤ect, by xing p0 > p^,
irrespective of whether the individual is solving a SDP or a BDP, the individual will
end up choosing a: the social planner can always ensure that the individual will always
end up at a type II equilibrium.
However, for this to be e¤ective, the planner must know the correct value of p^
which, in turn, requires the planner to know the underlying preferences. If the social
planner does not know this, she could end up choosing a value of p0 that is too low
and therefore, ine¤ective.
Again, as in the cases of direct and indirect paternalism, the extent, and useful-
ness, of soft paternalism is limited by the information available to the social planner.
In light of this problem, we propose an alternative policy approach labelled soft-
libertarian which does not require the planner to know or impose the normative
preferences of the individual. We argue in favour of interventions that directly target
the abilities needed to internalize the feedback from actions to psychological states.
6The two other cases are: (i) if p < p^; there exists a unique standard and behavioural equilibrium:
(a; p) = (a; p); (ii) if p > p^; there exists a unique standard and behavioural equilibrium: (a; p) =
(a; p):
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3.4 Soft-libertarian
Finally, we consider a soft-libertarian approach which directly addresses the point that
in a BDP, the individual doesnt internalize the feedback e¤ect. A soft-libertarian
policy stands in between a fully libertarian and a libertarian-paternalistic approach.
Instead of being the social planner the architect of the decision-maker choice as
proposed by the libertarian-paternalistic approach, we propose the DM herself to
become the architect of her own choice or, in Elsters (1983) words, her own
character planner. In that sense, the approach is not coercive. Moreover, it does
not require the social planner to have information about underlying preferences, the
feedback e¤ect or the decision making procedure. If observed choices satisfy Cherno¤
axiom (which characterizes a BDP and violates SDP) then helping the DM to learn
how to internalize his own feedback e¤ect will improve her welfare (at least weekly).
Note however, that in order to internalize the feedback e¤ect, the DM must ac-
knowledge the existence of a feedback map, understand which actions and how they
impact on her psychological states, and nally internalize it. We acknowledge that
this may not be an easy task for the DM. It requires capacities and information that
may seem unimportant with the lens of standard economic theory but they are crucial
in the framework proposed here.
An important policy question is how a DM gets to learn to internalize her feedback
e¤ects. The answer to this question depends very much on the type of decision
problem at hand. Simple feedback e¤ects can be learned with personal experience or
the experiences of similar others (e.g. role models)7. For example, as highlighted in
Beshears et al. (2008), only after paying late fees video renters learn to return their
videos on time (Fishman and Pope, 2007) and credit card account holders learn to pay
their bills on time (Agarwal et al., 2007). In a similar vein, sex workers begin using
condoms only when the information about the use of condoms is provided by other
trained sex workers and no behavioral change is observed when the information is
7Dalton et al (2010) propose a behavioural decision model with aspirations failure where it
is shown the way role models can impact aspirations and help the DM to scape from a lack of
aspirations/poverty trap.
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provided by bureaucrats (Rao and Walton, 2004). There is also empirical evidence of
sophisticated people who actually implement strategies that show an internalization
of a feedback e¤ect. For example, some people with self-control problems choose
activities that reduce the likelihood of encountering cues that trigger binges. They
purchase costly pre-commitment devices like small packages of junk food even when
the unit price is lower for larger packages (Wertenbroch, 1998) or self-impose costly
deadlines to overcome procrastination (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).
More complex feedback e¤ects (such as those involving emotions), however, may
require some sort of expert advice in order to be learned and internalized. One class
of expert advice consistent with our framework is psychological therapies (such us
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy)8. Most if not all psychological therapies are about
identifying the appropriate coping strategies (i.e. the feedback e¤ects) to modify
thoughts, beliefs, behavior and environments to improve peoples psychological states
(Hawton et al, 1989). Clinical psychologists know why people make mistakes in the
rst place (they know possible feedback e¤ects), and, more importantly, they apply
this understanding in their daily practice. A key normative principle of psycholog-
ical therapies is not to force the DM to undertake any action that the DM doesnt
want. The main aim is to help the DM to achieve what the own DM considers the
good life. In that sense, individual autonomy is not only fully respected but also en-
hanced. Psychological therapies have been shown to be e¤ective in helping people to
cope with depression, stress, anger, fear, anxiety or low self-condence. They either
change the DMs response to a situation (emotion-focused problem) or change the
environment (problem-focused coping) (Lazarus, 1984; Hawton et. al, 1989). In the
case of addiction, behavioral therapies teach cue-avoidance without providing new
information (Bernheim and Rangel, 2007). As argued by Baron (2006), emotions are
(partly) under peoples control and individuals can "induce or suppress emotions in
themselves almost on cue." Some people may even reshape their character, so that
their emotional responses change.
8Lowenstein and Haslie (2008) mention therapy as a methaphore for the new type of behavioural
economics policies. We dont consider it as a metaphore, but as a policy tool itself.
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What types of institutions can provide the capacities needed to internalize the
feedback e¤ect? As Mullainathan (2006) argues, good institutions also help to reduce
problems that arise within a person. An example of such institution is The Improv-
ing Access to Psychological Therapiesprogramme (IAPT) initiated in 2006 in the
UK. IAPT aims at o¤ering evidence based psychological therapies and psychological
support to a wide range of the population. Layard et al. (2008) argue that IAPT
does not only improve individual wellbeing but also social wellbeing by reducing other
public costs associated with psychological disorders (e.g. welfare benets and med-
ical costs) and increasing revenues (e.g. taxes from return to work and increased
productivity).
3.5 Other standard policies
To conclude this section, we highlight other typical policies that are thought to be
(at least weakly) welfare improving, but they can also be misleading in a behavioral
framework. For instance, it easy to construct examples where providing more infor-
mation or more opportunities to the DM may make her worse-o¤. Below we present
two of these examples.
More information may make the decision-maker worse-o¤
Consider a decision problem with payo¤ relevant uncertainty, with two states of
the world f1; 2g where preferences are
1 !
p1 p2 p3
a1  1 0 0
a2 0 3
1
2
a3 1 4 1
2 !
p1 p2 p3
a1 1 4 1
a2
1
2
3 0
a3 0 0  1
where (ai) = pi. Suppose, to begin with, the DM has to choose before uncertainty
is resolved. At the time when she makes the decision, the individual attaches a
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probability 1
2
to 1 and 12 to 2. In this case, expected payo¤ matrix is
p1 p2 p3
a1 0 2
1
2
a2
1
4
3 1
4
a3
1
2
2 0
It follows that the unique BDP outcome is (a2; p2) with expected payo¤ 3.
Next, suppose that the DM knows with probability one the true state of the world.
Then, when the state of the world is 1, a3 strictly dominates all other actions and
the unique BDP outcome is (a3; p3) with payo¤ 1 and when the state of the world
is 2, a1 strictly dominates all other actions and the unique BDP outcome is (a1; p1)
with payo¤ 1. Therefore, the decision-maker is worse-o¤ with more information910.
More actions may make the decision-maker worse-o¤
Consider rst a situation where the payo¤ table is
a1 a2
a1  1 0
a2 0 3
where (ai) = pi. The outcome of the BDP is (a2; p2) with payo¤ 3. Now, expand
the set of choices so that the following payo¤ table represents the decision problem
a1 a2 a3
a1  1 0 0
a2 0 3 1
a3 1 4 2
where (ai) = pi. Note that the unique BDP outcome is (a3; p3) with payo¤ 2 < 3.
This means that although the action set of the decision-maker has been expanded so
that (a) the ranking of existing actions is una¤ected and (b) the new action strictly
dominates all existing actions, the individual is made worse-o¤.
9Note that in this example we are referring only to information that solves the uncertainty
about exogenous states of the world. Our statement "the decision-maker is worse-o¤ with more
information" would not be right in the case in which additional information helps the decision-
maker to learn about the feedback.
10The example is consistent with Carrillo and Mariottis (2000) results, although we dont need a
dynamic model with time-inconsistent preferences to make the point.
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4 Normative grounds
The policy approach advocated in this paper is based on autonomy as a normative
criterion for welfare evaluation. As argued by philosopher Friednman (2003, p. 4)
autonomous behavior is based on the deeper wants and commitments of the person,
is partly caused by her reections on and rea¢ rmations of them.To realize auton-
omy a person must rst somehow reects on her wants and takes up an evaluative
stance with respect to them. Friednman (2003, p. 4) makes very clear the endo-
geneity of psychological states when she argues that for choices and actions to be
autonomous, the choosing and acting self as the particular self she is must play a role
in determining them [...] When wants and desires lead to choice or action without
having been self-reectively endorsed by the person, the resulting choices and actions
are not autonomous.The notion of self-government (the capacity to govern oneself)
is central to the concept of autonomy (Trout, 2005). A standard DM, as dened in
our framework, captures precisely that notion. As Ryan and Deci (2006) illustrate, a
man who decides to "have another drink" would not be autonomous unless, in reect-
ing on this motive, he could fully endorse it. The preferences that the standard DM
maximizes are exactly the preferences that Elster (1983, p.22) denes as autonomous
preferences: those that have been deliberately chosen, acquired or modied either
by an act of will or by a process of character planning.
The soft-libertarian approach, therefore, advocates interventions that promotes
the autonomy of the DM. The way in which the autonomy is enhanced is by helping
the DM to internalize her feedback e¤ects and thus to become a standard DM.
5 Final Remarks
We have addressed the implications of behavioral decisions for policy analysis. We
have proposed a concrete road map for the planner which incorporates the four policy
approaches (libertarian, paternalistic, soft-paternalistic and soft-libertarian).
The desirability of paternalistic interventions are limited by the information a
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planner has about an individuals normative preferences. We argued in favour of an al-
ternative policy approach labelled "soft-libertarian" which does not require knowledge
of the normative preferences of the DM. Consistent with autonomy being the norma-
tive criterion to adopt, soft-libertarian interventions aim at enhancing or sustaining
individual autonomy. Examples of such interventions are cognitive and behavioral
therapies that teach how to manage stress, anxiety, temptation and self-condence or
correct maladaptive beliefs that can lead to systematic self-defeating behavior. In-
terventions with this type of aims are not only restricted to psychotherapies, though.
Social programs aiming at increasing participantsself-condence or aspirations can
also be autonomy supportive. In general, these interventions have the explicit ob-
jective of empowering people, i.e. to help them to increase the sense of control over
their lives. Policies such as fostering empowerment or emotional intelligence have
been largely advocated in other social disciplines but somehow disregarded in the
literature of Economics. In this paper we have derived those policy implications from
a framework that reduces many existing seemingly disconnected models in behavioral
economics.
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